{"id":167,"date":"2022-07-20T23:05:46","date_gmt":"2022-07-20T23:05:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/?p=167"},"modified":"2022-07-20T23:05:46","modified_gmt":"2022-07-20T23:05:46","slug":"campaign-attributed-to-apt-c-36-context-and-iocs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/2022\/07\/20\/campaign-attributed-to-apt-c-36-context-and-iocs\/","title":{"rendered":"Campaign attributed to APT-C-36 context and IoCs"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>Overview<\/h1>\n<p>The following report provides the TTPs,and IOCs identified in a malware campaign impersonating the \u201cFiscal\u00eda General de la Naci\u00f3n\u201d from Colombia. Our research team identified this campaign through threat hunting on public sources.<\/p>\n<p>The group behind this campaign is <strong>APT-C-36,<\/strong> also know as <strong>Blind Eagle.<\/strong> Most TTPs coincide with previous campaigns attributed to this cybercriminal group in public investigations.<\/p>\n<p>SCILabs was unable to identify the initial attack vector; however, we determined with high confidence that as in the previous campaigns, the attackers are distributing the malware through phishing emails with a PDF document attached. We make this hypothesis based on the TTPs that we observed in <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/1ZRR4H\/status\/1503572957595111427\">previous campaigns<\/a> of this threat group.<\/p>\n<p>Like the previous campaign, the cybercriminals continue using <a href=\"https:\/\/malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de\/details\/win.njrat\">njRAT<\/a>. As it is known, this kind of trojans has similar capabilities like stealing credentials stored in browsers, opening a reverse shell, uploading and downloading files, as well as a password stealer and a keylogger among others.<\/p>\n<p>Based on the TTPs identified and the capabilities identified in the malware used by the attackers, the objective of this campaign is the theft of user information in Colombia.<\/p>\n<h1>How could it affect an organization?<\/h1>\n<p>The attackers mainly target users in Colombia; the attacker&#8217;s goal is implant a backdoor to control the target computer and provide the basis for lateral moves and other types of attacks related to the theft of sensitive information, which can cause financial and reputational losses in the affected companies.<\/p>\n<h1>Analysis<\/h1>\n<h1>Threat Context<\/h1>\n<p>SCILabs recovered a PDF file through threat hunting in public sources; the file includes a hyperlink to the One Drive servers, which leads to the download of a password-protected BZ2-type compressed file with a .vbs file inside. The password is inside the PDF file.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\" wp-image-170 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"860\" height=\"299\" \/><\/p>\n<p>The .vbs file downloads a text file that contains a PowerShell encoded script to perform the following operations:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Decode <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/crawl3r\/FunWithAMSI\"><strong>FunWithAMSI<\/strong> <\/a>library to Bypass Microsoft AMSI (Windows Antimalware Scan Interface)<\/li>\n<li>Save the <strong>njRAT<\/strong> payload to the Windows registry<\/li>\n<li>Generate the necessary files to obtain persistence<\/li>\n<li>Execute the last file to complete the infection by injecting the <strong>njRAT<\/strong> trojan into the <strong>aspnet_compiler.exe<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-171\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"791\" height=\"485\" \/><\/p>\n<h1>Attack Flow<\/h1>\n<p>Below we show the attack flow observed in the investigation.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-172 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen3.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1316\" height=\"640\" \/><\/p>\n<h1>Technical Summary<\/h1>\n<p>The <strong>APT-C-36<\/strong> group initial access method commonly is phishing emails impersonating various organizations, mainly in Colombia in this case. SCILabs could only retrieve the PDF file attached to the phishing email impersonating the &#8220;Fiscal\u00eda General de la Naci\u00f3n&#8221; from Colombia.<\/p>\n<p>The PDF file contains a URL that leads to a password protected .bz2 file downloaded from legitimate One Drive servers. The .bz2file contains a Visual BasicScript.<\/p>\n<p>The attacker uses a fileless technique using the .vbs script to download from <strong>Discord<\/strong> servers a text file that contains base64 encoded PowerShell instructions to perform the following actions:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Decode <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/crawl3r\/FunWithAMSI\">FunWithAMSI<\/a> library to Bypass Microsoft AMSI (Windows Antimalware Scan Interface)<\/li>\n<li>Save the njRAT payload to the Windows registry default value in key <strong>HKCU:\\software\\wow6432node\\Microsoft\\WindowsUpdate<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>Generate the following files to obtain persistence and end the infection chain:<\/li>\n<li><strong>SystemLogin.bat<\/strong>: Encoded batch file to execute the last stage of infection through the System Binary Proxy Execution technique via <strong>mshta<\/strong> utility and <strong>PowerShell<\/strong> sentence. This file is dropped in the <strong>%AppData%\\Roaming<\/strong> folder<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-173\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen4.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1811\" height=\"37\" \/><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Login1.vbs<\/strong>: Visual Basic Script dropped in Windows <strong>Startup<\/strong> folder to generate persistence and execute the <strong>SystemLogin.bat<\/strong> file<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-168\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen5.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1215\" height=\"161\" \/><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>myScript.ps1<\/strong>: Encoded PowerShell Script dropped in Windows <strong>%PUBLIC%<\/strong> folder to generate persistence and execute the <strong>SystemLogin.bat file<\/strong>. This file contains a <strong>njRAT<\/strong> injector, the encoded <strong>FunWithAMSI<\/strong> DLL, the <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/mervick\/aes-everywhere\/tree\/master\/net\"><strong>AES Everywhere<\/strong><\/a> library to decrypt the <strong>njRAT<\/strong> payload, and the statements to inject the trojan into the legitimate <strong>aspnet_compiler.exe<\/strong> executable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-169\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen6.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1217\" height=\"265\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Finally, the <strong>aspnet_compiler.exe<\/strong> executable found in the <strong>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319<\/strong> directory is used to inject the <strong>njRAT<\/strong> trojan and begin communication with the C2 domain(<strong>1204abril[.]duckdns[.]org[:]2001<\/strong>).<\/p>\n<p>It is important to mention that, in general, the TTPs of the previous investigations continue to be maintained; however, SCILabs identified that the adversary is using Visual Basic Script files as the first dropper instead of JavaScriptfiles.<\/p>\n<h1>Diamond Model<\/h1>\n<p>Below we show the diamond model observed during the investigation.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-205\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen8.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"748\" height=\"473\" \/><\/p>\n<h1>Overlaps between APT-C-36 previous campaignsand this campaign(key indicators)<\/h1>\n<p>To determine that the adversary of the previous campaigns and the currents are the same, SCILabs used the \u201crule of 2 \u201dwhich says that to determine that two threats are the same, there must be overlaps in at least two vertices of the diamond model. Here is the result of applying this rule:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<table id=\"sheet0\" class=\"sheet0 gridlines\" border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\">\n<tbody>\n<tr class=\"row0\" style=\"color: #ffffff;\" bgcolor=\"#1E679A\">\n<td class=\"column0 style1 s\"><b>Diamond model<\/b><span style=\"color: #ffffff; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style1 s\"><b>Key indicators (Intrusion Data) &amp; Overlaps<\/b><span style=\"color: #ffffff; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style1 s\"><b>Context<\/b><span style=\"color: #ffffff; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row1\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"4\">Password protected compressed file to distribute the first dropper.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row2\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1566.001 &#8211; Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row3\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">Password protected compressed file<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row4\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">Colombian users and organizations<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row5\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"4\">PDF file for the victim to download the first stage of infection chain.<br \/>\nAccording to public investigations, related emails used to attack the Colombian government, financial institutions and large companies have been found.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row6\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1566.001 &#8211; Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row7\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">PDF file or Maldoc impersonating the \u201cFiscal\u00eda General de la Naci\u00f3n.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row8\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row9\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"4\">Based on public research and the TTPs observed by SCILabs, the adversaries use JavaScript, Visual Basic Script, and PowerShell for the different stages of infection.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row10\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1059 \u2013 Command and Scripting Interpreter<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row11\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">Development of artifacts using scripting languages like Visual Basic Script, PowerShell, and JavaScript. Additionally, the use of commodity RATs like njRAT<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row12\">\n<td class=\"column0 style7 s\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations\u00a0Current campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row13\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"7\">Attackers often download encrypted text files from external systems containing embedded artifacts such as commodity RATs or DLL injectors to deploy the malware.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row14\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1105 \u2013 Ingress Tool Transfer<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row15\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"3\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"3\">njRAT version 0.7NC<br \/>\nGeneric DLL injector<br \/>\nMalware Parameters<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row16\"><!-- Fill row16 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row17\"><!-- Fill row17 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row18\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row19\"><!-- Fill row19 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row20\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"6\">Attackers uses non-standard ports to their c2 servers.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row21\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1571 \u2013 Non-Standard Port<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row22\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns ports: 57831, 2050, 57831<br \/>\nCurrent campaign: 2001<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row23\"><!-- Fill row23 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row24\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row25\"><!-- Fill row25 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row26\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"7\">Adversaries use obfuscated code throughout the infection chain, using plain text files as the primary means of storing payloads and commands.<br \/>\nThey often use base64 algorithms and replacement of letters or special characters in obfuscated payloads.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row27\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1027 \u2013 Obfuscated Files or Information<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row28\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"3\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"3\">BASE64 algorithms<br \/>\nReplacing letters and special chars<br \/>\nTheir own functions to obfuscate data<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row29\"><!-- Fill row29 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row30\"><!-- Fill row30 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row31\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row32\"><!-- Fill row32 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row33\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"5\">Attackers have used the commodity RAT njRAT.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row34\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1588.002 \u2013 Obtain Capabilities Tool<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row35\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">njRAT<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row36\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row37\"><!-- Fill row37 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row38\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"5\">The attackers use a .vbs script in the Windows Startup folder to generate persistence.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row39\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1547.001 Boot or Logon Auto start Execution: Registry Run Keys \/ Startup Folder<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row40\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">VBS script in the Windows Startup folder to generate persistence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row41\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row42\"><!-- Fill row42 --><\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row43\">\n<td class=\"column0 style2 s\">Adversary<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style2 s\">APT-C-36 previous campaigns \/ APT-C-36 current campaign<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column2 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"5\">In recent campaigns, adversaries have used domains from the Duckdns service via the HTTP protocol to communicate with the c2 server.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row44\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">TTP<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">T1071.001 \u2013 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row45\">\n<td class=\"column0 style4 s\">Infrastructure<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style5 s\">Duckdns domains<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row46\">\n<td class=\"column0 style6 s style6\" rowspan=\"2\">Victim<span style=\"color: #000000; font-family: 'Arial'; font-size: 8pt;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<td class=\"column1 style3 s style3\" rowspan=\"2\">Previous campaigns: Colombian users and organizations<br \/>\nCurrent campaigns: Users in Colombia<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"row47\"><!-- Fill row47 --><\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>In this exercise, the overlaps between the infrastructure vertices and capabilities\/TTPs of the diamond model can be observed, complying with the rule of 2 and supporting that the adversary behind this campaign is probably <strong>APT-C-36<\/strong>. SCILabs will continue to monitor these campaigns to obtain more elements that allow raising the level of certainty of the attribution.<\/p>\n<h1>TTPs observed aligned to MITRE&#8217;s ATT&amp;CK framework<\/h1>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-201\" src=\"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en2\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2022\/07\/Imagen7.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1318\" height=\"439\" \/><\/p>\n<h1>Assessment<\/h1>\n<p>The APT-C-36 threat group is characterized by using commodity RATs such as njRAT; however, SCILabs has identified that the artifacts used during the infection chain have a shallow detection rate by commercial antivirus solutions. Additionally, they are constantly adjusting their artifacts, such as using .vbs files instead of JavaScript files and using different PDF templates or pretexts in their emails to evade the anti-spam protections.<\/p>\n<p>This adversary employs fileless and living off the land techniques, uses legitimate servers like OneDrive and Discord to store malicious artifacts, and various obfuscation and encryption algorithms. This can make it difficult for security solutions to identify malicious behavior easily; for this reason, it is important for organizations to perform threat hunting on organizations&#8217; endpoints and workstations considering directories, registry keys, and executables as those mentioned in this report.<\/p>\n<p>These characteristics make this adversary a focus of attention because SCILabs considers that attackers could begin to consider in the future attacking victims in other countries such as Mexico in all kinds of organizations. Therefore, for SCILabs it is important that organizations are up to date on the TTPs used by this adversary and that could be copied by other cybercriminal groups to carry out more destructive attacks.<\/p>\n<p>We believe that the ideal victims of this type of campaign are the organizations that do not pay special attention to behavioral indicators and that do not know in detail the stages of the infection chain of this type of attack. SCILabs believes that this adversary will continue to use commodity RATs and will continue to target LATAM; however, based on our telemetry, cybercriminals will continue to modify their artifacts to improve their effectiveness.<\/p>\n<h1>IOCs<\/h1>\n<p>386CEAFDE6870930B4C0C0FAF3274A7A<\/p>\n<p>C86433C0F61D1DF61208B2CFCA02543F<\/p>\n<p>F967C869142E3242BFCA0E9C38CDD6FD<\/p>\n<p>324DB54A7DF625B2CBF6B75E9EFEC140<\/p>\n<p>2BB9168601ED09F975041B3E5593A764<\/p>\n<p>889BDEAF65D152BEC9512A768B73CB5A<\/p>\n<p>08FBA67E620C5AF2C4738EAB767A78D5<\/p>\n<p>HXXPS[:]\/\/ONEDRIVE[.]LIVE[.]COM\/DOWNLOAD?CID=7F3ACF9F2D72D5A5&amp;RESID=7F3ACF9F2D72D5A5%21827&amp;AUTHKEY=AMZ2CWHP91GKHCI<\/p>\n<p>HXXPS[:]\/\/CDN[.]DISCORDAPP[.]COM\/ATTACHMENTS\/911673301896691753\/976527856819646504\/MIO18MAYOMIO[.]TXT<\/p>\n<p>1204ABRIL[.]DUCKDNS[.]ORG[:]2001<\/p>\n<p>ABRIL[.]DUCKDNS[.]ORG<\/p>\n<p>HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\bf02403cd3e34e50a6f<\/p>\n<p>HKCU:\\SOFTWARE \\wow6432node\\Microsoft\\WindowsUpdate<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Overview The following report provides the TTPs,and IOCs identified in a malware campaign impersonating the \u201cFiscal\u00eda General de la Naci\u00f3n\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[15,18],"class_list":["post-167","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-malware","tag-trojan"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/167","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=167"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/167\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=167"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=167"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.scilabs.mx\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=167"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}